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Abstract
We present the arguments suggesting that time is emergent in quantum gravity and discuss
extensively, but without any technical detail, the many aspects that can be involved in such
emergence. We refer to both the physical issues that need to be tackled, by quantum gravity
formalisms, to realize concretely this emergent picture of time, and the conceptual challenges
that have to be addressed in parallel to achieve a proper understanding of it.
1 Preambles
The purpose of this contribution is to outline a few key lessons about the nature of time from current
physical theories as well as from promising theories under development, and the many ways in which it
should be considered an emergent, non-fundamental notion. We will be as comprehensive as possible,
but still offer only a summary of results and arguments that we have discussed in more detail elsewhere
[1, 2, 3, 4], while we also develop those thoughts further, in some cases. Also, we will have to leave
out all the technical/mathematical material on which our understanding of the issues is based, citing
useful references when needed. As we will try to convey, there is a lot that can be said about physical
time, but it should also be obvious (first of all to readers of this collective book, by a quick look at
the table of contents) that ‘time’is a multi-faceted notion, so much that one should maybe speak of
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the many ‘times’of our world, from the psychological to the physical, from the physiological to the
ecological one1. Thus, the first thing to do is to narrow down the scope of our discussion.
1.1 Our focus: physical time as deduced from our best theories
We restrict our attention to physical time only, out of necessity, and of limited personal competence.
Moreover, we approach the question “what is physical time?” in a rather pragmatic manner (from
the perspective of a scientist, at least). We intend by “physical time”what is expressed in the
mathematical models used in physics to account for our experience of the world, i.e. our best current
physical theories.
It is important to notice that the mathematical models used in physics leave out a number of aspects
of the physical world and of our interaction with it. Observations and observers are either not
modelled at all or highly idealized. That is, many aspects of actual, real world, physical observations
are left out altogether (for example details of the measurement apparatuses we use, or physiological
aspects of perception). In addition, any physical theory is in itself a model (or collection of models)
of a portion of the physical world, and its ‘lessons’are thus necessarily partial [6]. This implies that
our conclusions about the nature of physical time are going to be by necessity the result of some
idealization. This is something that we should not see as a problem or a disappointing fact, but
something to be embraced, exactly because it leaves much to be explored further, about how to
improve the same theories, the relation with other sciences and other aspects of the world, and so on.
In any case, we would argue (but not on this occasion), that any understanding is modeling and any
model is also the result of some mixture of idealization, abstraction and approximation.
Our main focus, i.e. to illustrate the nature of physical time as deduced from the best current theories
and from those under development, is also the result of a basic naturalistic attitude. Any metaphysics
(e.g. any statement about the ontology of time) can only be deduced, or at least strongly influenced
by, and should be necessarily consistent with our best scientific theories. We simply state this point
here in order to frame our approach better, by being transparent about some underlying assumptions,
but it is also one that would deserve to be argued for. Luckily, other competent scholars have done
it already, from different perspectives [7, 8].
1See [5] and all the resources listed at http://www.studyoftime.org/
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1.2 Emergence and its many kinds
The main focus of our discussion of the physical time is its emergent nature. We will argue that this
is already visible in classical General Relativity but becomes even more radically manifest when we
consider the (possible) implications of a theory of quantum gravity. Thus, it is worth clarifying be-
forehand what we mean by ‘emergence’and to point out the many forms in which emergent behaviour
and emergent notions can show up. These different manifestations will also enter our discussion about
time in quantum gravity (for early work on this issue, see [9]).
In order to develop our arguments, we rest on the notion of emergence put forward by Butterfield and
collaborators[10, 11] (see [12] for a broader set of views on the issue of emergence in science): a physical
behaviour or phenomenon is understood as emergent if it is sufficiently novel and robust with respect
to some comparison class, usually associated to the class of behaviours and phenomena it emerges
from. Very often (but not as a matter of necessity, so to be included in the definition) emergent
phenomena are associated to some form of limit or to some approximation[13, 14, 15, 16], applied to
the mathematical model describing them and the physical context they emerge from. This definition
is simple and general enough to accommodate all known examples of emergent phenomena in physics.
It is also somewhat vague, at this stage, but any further refinement would be at risk of restricting
too much its scope (leaving out some interesting physical example) and forcing us into unnecessary
complications for our purposes. It agrees with the routine use of the term in physics (which is in
fact even more vaguely defined). It should be taken as a first step toward a full characterization and
understanding of specific emergent phenomena, not the final step, something flexible enough to be
adapted and deepened when needed, in different contexts.
One key feature of this definition is that it is not in contradiction or incompatible with reduction (this
being basically understood, within a mathematical modelling of the relevant phenomena or a logical
analysis of the corresponding explanatory links, as deduction). Indeed, reduction is usually needed
to specify the comparison class for identifying the novel and robust elements of emergent phenomena.
The link between emergence and reduction can be so strong that one could often understand one
as the converse, complementary process of the other, at the epistemological level. In the context of
mathematical modelling of physical systems, one often understand some phenomenon as emergent
from another exactly because it has been shown to be deducible (i.e. mathematically derivable, within
all sorts of approximations) from the other. It goes without saying, then, that we are speaking here
only of what is usually referred to as weak emergence, as opposed to strong emergent behaviour [17, 12],
with which we will not be concerned.
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Assuming the same naturalistic attitude we stated above, thus not positing any a priori ontology to
which then force our scientific theories, but reading it out (with all inevitable ambiguities) from them,
emergent behaviour poses an immediate dilemma: which of side of the emergence/reduction relation
should be assigned an ontological status? The ‘fundamental’one only, to which the emergent phenom-
ena can be reduced? or do both the emergent and the fundamental sides have a correspondent ontology
of equal metaphysical weight? In the following, we do not assume a ‘fundamentalist’ontology, i.e. we
do not assume that the non-symmetric relation between ‘fundamental’and ‘emergent’phenomena is
also a primacy relation at the ontological level, adopting instead an implicit multi-layered ontology2.
In the case of time, our arguments supporting the idea that ‘time is emergent’, do not imply auto-
matically, in our view, that ‘time does not exist’tout court. In case, the latter statement should be
argued for.
Last, we point out several sub-notions of emergence (see [18, 19, 20, 21] for more details). All of them
enter our discussion about time as an emergent notion.
The first kind of emergence is inter-theoretic emergence, basically understood as the converse of
inter-theoretic reduction. Here, we speak of a set of physical phenomena as emergent from another,
if the theoretical description of the latter can be reduced to the one of the former (i.e. the theoret-
ical description of the former can be deduced, under some appropriate procedure involving limits,
approximations and more) from the theoretical description of the latter.
The second kind is ontological emergence, when we say that a set of entities is in fact emergent
from another, though some physical process), and under the assumption that the relation is not
symmetric and definitely not one of equivalence. This second kind is distinct from the first, generally
speaking, but, within our naturalistic assumption, it ends up being so strictly associated with it to
be indistinguishable for all practical purposes.
A third kind of emergent physical behaviour is associated to situations, in which one set of phenomena
is replaced by a (often radically) different one as one considers different values of some ‘control’physical
quantities or parameters, but without any real asymmetry in the relation between the two sets.
One can speak of this kind of emergence when referring to a specific dynamical process, in which
the control physical quantities evolve in time from one value to another, producing the change in
associated physical phenomena; but one can also speak of this kind of (symmetric) emergence, as a
change in theoretical description, if referring to the mathematical models used to describe both sets
2This is not to say that the ‘fundamentalist’view is not reasonable or correct as a metaphysical position, but just
that we do not assume it.
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of phenomena and depending on the control paramaters. Due to the symmetric nature of the relation,
speaking of emergence in this case can be seen as an abuse of language. However, on the one hand,
this use of the term is found regularly in the physics literature (and very often in the philosophical
one too); on the other hand, our definition of emergence, given above following Butterfield et al did
not include any asymmetry condition, thus we have no reason at this stage to exclude tis case from
consideration. We point out that no reduction is involved by this third kind of emergence, per se,
even if in all examples we can think of there is an underlying reduction relation, not between the
two sides of this “emergence relation of the third kind”, but between each of them and a third set of
phenomena, common to both.
Looking at the concrete physical situations in which these three kinds of emergence are identified,
they are often labeled as synchronic emergence, for the first two kinds, and diachronic emergence,
for the third. This is because the third is often associated to physical processes taking place in
time, while the first two do not refer to temporal change at all. As we will discuss, this terminology
is problematic, first of all because at the theoretical level, also the third kind of emergence can be
defined in a way that makes no reference to temporal evolution, but also, and most importantly for our
present purposes, any implicit or explicit reference to time would obviously mess up the application
of these concepts to the case of time itself and for the understanding of its own emergent nature.
All these kinds of emergence should be considered in the case of spacetime in quantum gravity,
and time in particular, as we do in the following. Our discussion should be seen in the context of
a growing body of work on spacetime emergence in quantum gravity in the philosophy literature
[22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28], in addition of course to the quantum gravity literature.
1.3 Making things concrete: an example of emergent behaviour
The above discussion is certainly overly sketchy and abstract. Therefore, let us give a concrete
illustration of the various notions of emergence, using an example that is as uncontroversial as it can
get, at least from the point of view of the usual physics parlance3.
Consider the physical system identified as water molecules4. They are well described in the math-
ematical language of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, with a Schroedinger evolution equation
for their quantum states, an Hamiltonian encoding the relevant forces between them and, in case,
3Still, this example has been extensively analysed and discussed in the philosophical literature, unraveling a number
of interesting conceptual subtleties.
4In fact, for what follows, any atomic system would work
5
external ones they may be subject to, and their quantum observables: their individual momenta and
positions, their angular momenta etc. This description is in principle valid for any number of them,
but when their number is high, collective effects become mostly important, the relevant physical
quantities we want to have control of are different, and the quantum description in terms of the
individual molecule states is not manageable, and in fact irrelevant for most practical purposes. We
usually switch then to a description in terms of (quantum) statistical mechanics, which is the relevant
mathematical context also if we are interested in their behaviour at non-zero temperature, which is
basically always the case. Other macroscopic and collective quantities, like the pressure they are
collectively subject to or the total occupied volume, become important at this level of description.
While the quantum properties of water molecules and their constituent atoms are crucial for their
microscopic physics, as well as for their higher level chemical consequences, their macroscopic proper-
ties are not much determined by quantum features, and if they are what we are interested it, we can
study the system in a classical approximation. In fact, we know that in a given range of temperature
and pressure, and when the number of molecules is sufficiently large, the description of the system
as a single entity called water, a fluid, rather than a collection of molecules, and the theoretical
framework of hydrodynamics, is the most efficient way of understanding the system. At this level of
description, new dynamical quantities like the density of the fluid or its collective velocity, and new
physical concepts like viscosity, vorticity, and so on, are the relevant ones.
The situation is more complex than this, though. At the same macroscopic level of description,
for large numbers of molecules, but different ranges of temperature and pressure, what replaces
the microscopic description in terms of molecules is not hydrodynamics, but one in terms of lattice
structures and their deformations. Liquid water turns into ice, a solid, whose physics is very different
from that of liquids and requires new concepts and different mathematical tools. And at yet other
values of temperature and pressure, without changing the microscopic description of the system, we
have vapour instead, with yet another description and different physics. Liquid water, vapour and
ice are different macroscopic phases of the same microscopic system, separated by phase transitions.
Where can we speak of emergence in all this? At several places, in fact [29, 30].
The very step from a quantum to a classical description of the water molecules, before one considers
their collective behaviour, is often taken as an example of emergence, that of a classical world from the
quantum one. There is no doubt that classical properties are novel with respect to the typical quantum
behaviour, and robust enough that we can often forget the underlying quantum world. It is then a
case of emergence, but one that does not entail any ontological emergence, since the basic entities at
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both classical and quantum level are the same molecules, that simply change physical behaviour. It
is however an inter-theoretic emergence, since we do indeed change theoretical framework to describe
the same molecules in the two regimes, from quantum to classical mechanics. The move from the
molecular dynamics to the fluid hydrodynamics is much more radical, though. It is a case of inter-
theoretic emergence as well, but one that entails a switch to a different set of dynamical variables and
observables, and marked by the appearance of new concepts altogether, simply not applicable before
the switch (what is the viscosity of ten molecules?). At the same time, we know that all the above is
not incompatible with reduction, since there is a clear sense in which we can reduce hydrodynamics
to molecular dynamics and, for example, define hydrodynamic variables in terms of suitable averages
of molecular ones.
The counterpart of this radical inter-theoretic emergence is also a change in the basic ontology, if we
base this on the theoretical description of the system: a collection of molecules, first, each with asso-
ciated particle-like properties, and a fluid, then, described by continuum fields (density and velocity).
We have ontological emergence too. This is a consequence of a different type of limit/approximation
that the quantum-to-classical one: a continuum and thermodynamic limit, without which we would
not have a liquid-like continuum phase.
The distinction, conceptual and mathematical, between classical and continuum approximation, is a
crucial point also in the quantum gravity case. In fact, not only the two limits are very much distinct,
but the order in which they are taken has, in general, important consequences. If we had considered
helium-4 atoms instead of water molecules, approximating them first with classical entities and then
considering their continuum limit would have given a very similar hydrodynamic behaviour as that
of water; on the contrary, taking the continuum limit while retailing their quantum properties would
have led us, in the appropriate range of temperature and pressure (plus a few other conditions), to
superfluid hydrodynamics first, as a macroscopic consequence of their quantum statistics. One needs
a further classical approximation at the continuum level to recover standard hydrodynamics. The
many striking properties of superfluids would have remained hidden, if we had conflated, conceptually
and mathematically, the two types of limits.
The result of this limit, however, is not unique. Depending on the value of temperature and pressure,
here treated as external control parameters of the theoretical description, from the same molecular
system we could arrive at a solid system or at vapour: the system can organize itself, macroscopically,
in different inequivalent continuum phases, which correspond, in fact, to different macroscopic systems
with very different properties (and ontology?) and which can all be said to be emergent with respect
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to the molecular one. These are all examples of inter-theoretic and ontological emergence[13, 14, 16].
Notice that the relation between the two descriptions, and the corresponding physical systems, is
not symmetric. There is a clear sense in which the fluid comes from the molecules and not viceversa
(not least, because also ice and vapour come from the same molecules). Notice also that there is
no dynamical process involved, i.e. nothing that the molecules ‘do’to become liquid water or ice, no
dynamical evolution from molecules to water or ice. It is the theoretical description that changes,
not the molecules or the fluid. We can speak of synchronic emergence. However, the existence
of different continuum phases allows for phase transitions. These are switches between different
theoretical descriptions of the same system (from the microscopic point of view) or between two
different physical systems with their associated theoretical descriptions (from the macroscopic point
of view). But they can also be seen as actual physical processes, taking place (in time) when the
control quantities (temperature and pressure) change. Phase transitions can be seen then as examples
of emergence of the third, diachronic kind mentioned above.
Three points are worth remarking, to conclude. First, in the case of phase transitions, the emergence
relation is symmetric; there is no sense in which one would say that ice is more fundamental than liquid
water or viceversa, either at the ontological or at the theoretical level, and they are on equal footing
with respect to the molecular dynamics. Second, while it is a fact of life that the phase transition can
be a temporal process (ice melts, and liquid water boils), its usual description is in terms of equilibrium
statistical mechanics where time and dynamics play no role. It is considered an approximation to
a more realistic (and much more involved) non-equilibrium description in terms of our standard,
non-relativistic temporal evolution with respect to an absolute time, but the equilibrium description
is not inconsistent in any way. Third, we find straightforward to interpret the phase transition as a
physical process because the relevant parameters can indeed be controlled and made to change from
the outside, by the observer or the experimenter manipulating the collection of molecules in the lab
(or at home). The last two points will be especially relevant in the discussion of the emergence of
phase transitions in quantum gravity, since in that context the situation is much more tricky.
2 What is time, in General Relativity
Let us now turn to time in General Relativity, our best theory of time, space and geometry and,
indeed, gravitational phenomena. The reason for the latter link is that gravitational phenomena, in
General Relativity, are equivalent to geometric properties of spacetime, i.e. statements about duration
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of time intervals, distances between objects, relations between reference frames, i.e. the very notions
of space and time directions used by different observers, and so on. Gravity is spacetime geometry,
in General Relativity, that is its main lesson. And this encapsulates our current best understanding
of both gravity and spacetime. So we take it seriously and ask what is time, in this context.
2.1 Manifold points, diffeomorphisms and background independence
General relativity is a theory of continuum (in fact, smooth) fields defined on a (differentiable) mani-
fold (i.e. a set of points with appropriate regularity properties). Thus, the ontology behind the theory
is given by these elements: fields and manifold. Often, we label the manifold a ‘spacetime’ manifold
and identify its points as ‘spacetime events’, i.e. the loci where and when things happen. Among
the fields, the metric field enters any determination of geometric properties of spacetime and, in a
way, of spacetime itself. We routinely speak of spatiotemporal distances between events, spacetime
curvature at a specific event, time elapsed between two events taking place at different points in space,
and causal relations between events. All these quantities are functions of the metric field, leading
to the identification of the metric field, thus the gravitational field, with the geometry of spacetime
itself as instantiated by a manifold of events. This is all good, and, as a convenient fiction or an
approximate substitute for a more rigorous story, routinely used with success in doing physics. Taken
more literally, though, it is unsatisfactory.
The reason is that General Relativity is invariant under diffeomorphisms of the manifold, mapping
the points of the manifold to one another, and the consequent transformation of all fields defined on
it, mapping the values they take at different points in the manifold to one another. The values of fields
at different points in the manifold are physically equivalent, if they are related by a diffeomorphism
transformation5.
The debate on the precise implications of this fact is still active [31, 32, 33], but we subscribe
to the view (rather predominant in the physics community and in a good part of the philosophy
community) according to which this means that the manifold and its points do not really carry
any physical meaning. They are thus not part of the ontology of the world, if not as providing
global (topological) conditions on the fields. The world is made of fields and fields only. Moreover,
5All this can be expressed in terms of coordinates, as often done, by identifying diffeomorphisms between points as
changes of coordinates at the same point; however, this can be very misleading, since physical theories can be written
in coordinate independent manner and this does not change in any way their symmetry properties with respect to
diffeomorphism transformations.
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diffeomorphism invariance is closely related (in fact, up to some additional subtleties, it can be
identified) with background independence[34, 35]. That is, all fields are dynamical entities, subject
to their ‘equations of motion’constraining their allowed values and mutual relations. And generic
solutions of the equations of the theory, i.e. generic allowed configurations of fields, possess no
feature that can be used to single out a preferred direction of time or space.
This absence of a preferred, non-dynamical, absolute notion of time is what is often indicated by
the statement that ‘there is no fundamental time’in General Relativity [36], contrary to what is
the case in all non-general relativistic physics, including standard quantum mechanics and quantum
field theory, and it is a fact. We can get around this uncomfortable fact only when working with
specific solutions of the theory, like the flat Minkowski geometry of special relativity or other highly
symmetric configurations of the metric6; in this case, the symmetries of such configurations allow to
identify special directions on the manifold as a preferred temporal (or spatial) direction and we deal
with an absolute (maybe up to some further transformations, e.g. Lorentz) global time. But beyond
these special cases, there is no (preferred) time in GR.
2.2 Relational time (and space)
If what we are left with are dynamical fields, including the metric (i.e. the gravitational field), where
is time in GR? and what do we mean by events and their temporal interval? and how is it that
we can routinely use coordinates and manifold points to identify events, and functions of the metric
defined at such points to measure time? The general answers to these questions, at least as a matter
of conceptual clarity and formal mathematical constructions (the detailed physical constructions can
be problematic), are given by a ‘relational strategy’[37, 38, 39, 40]. If the only things that exist
are fields, the only physical observables are relations among (values of) fields. In particular, any
quantity that we interpret in spatiotemporal manner, in GR, is a relation between specifically chosen
fields, used to define clocks and rods and, by doing so, time and space. All such quantities that
correspond to some determination of geometric properties of time and space are then appropriate
functions of fields necessarily including the metric. In this sense, also in any rigorous construction of
spatiotemporal quantities, the gravitational field will be a necessary ingredient, justifying its often
stated identification with spacetime itself.
Let us give a sketchy example. Instead of having two fields each evaluated at point in “time”t
identified with the value of some coordinate along a given manifold direction on a manifold, we use
6Or special boundary conditions, corresponding again to highly symmetric geometries.
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one of the field as a clock and its values to define instants of time, and measure the evolution of the
(values of the) other field as a function of (the values of) such clock (the coordinate time and the
direction on the manifold have then entirely disappeared from the physical picture, as they should).
The theory itself does not select any physical field as a preferred choice of clock (thus, time). This
is the more physical way of characterizing the general covariance of the theory, without referring to
unphysical coordinates or manifold directions.
Most importantly, in general fields behave like good clocks only approximately, only locally (i.e. for
some limited range of their values) or in special (and dynamically chosen) configurations.
To have a good notion of time (or, equivalently, a good clock) the physical system used to define it
should interact too strongly with the other fields (including the gravitational field) or with itself, it
should not have exceedingly complicated dynamics, and, for the same system to define a globally valid
notion of time, further restrictive conditions should be at least approximately true. In particular, in
the approximation (or idealized case) in which they do have a vanishing energy-momentum, and thus
vanishing effect on the geometry of spacetime, and vanishing self-interaction, and trivial dynamics,
then they do behave like simple coordinates labelling manifold points, and can then be used to define
time (and space), and the evolution of other fields, forgetting about their own physical nature. In
the end, in General Relativity there is no (preferred, external) time, but there are many (an infinity)
imperfect, approximate physical clocks, each providing a possible definition of physical time with its
own limited applicability.
In General Relativity, then, time is a specific (set of) approximate relation(s) between continuous
physical fields, and from them it inherits its continuous, ordered (and approximate) nature. A last
comment is probably useful. An interesting body of work in the classical and quantum gravity
literature concerns the ‘deparametrization’of General Relativity in terms of suitable matter fields
[41, 42, 43, 44]. This entails rewriting the full theory in relational terms with respect to the reference
frame defined by them, in such a way that one does not need to deal with diffeomorphism symmetry
anymore, that all resulting relational observables are physical and the dynamics takes a more standard
form with respect to the time defined by the appropriate component of the matter fields. The
drawback of this type of strategy, at the classical level, is that the matter fields that allow for this
type of rewriting are always somewhat unphysical. In turn this is basically inevitable since they have
to provide exactly that type of global, perfect clock and rods, with associated globally defined notions
of time and space that, as we discussed, we expect being no more than an idealization or the result
of some approximation.
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The above means that, from the point of view of General Relativity, time as an absolute, uniquely
identified notion, like in Newtonian mechanics and pre-relativistic physics, is an emergent notion.
It appears for special configurations of the gravitational field, in the approximation in which all
relativistic effects are suppressed and all physical clocks (that is, other matter fields used as such)
behave uniformly, in addition of being assumed to have no impact on other dynamical entities (so
that they can be treated as measuring an external parameter). It is then an instance of inter-theoretic
(or vertical) emergence. Whether it can also be considered as an example of ontological emergence is
more dubious. While in the step from relativistic physics to newtonian mechanics fields are replaced
by particles and forces as fundamental entities (this is indeed an example of ontological emergence),
those fields whose relations define time in GR would stop being part of the dynamical entities of
the world and give rise to an absolute, external, non-dynamical notion of time, that can hardly be
considered a physical entity on its own.
3 What is time in quantum gravity, if this is quantized GR
We expect, however, that General Relativity is not the final story, and that there is more to say,
about time in physics. We expect this, for example, because of puzzling aspects of astrophysics and
cosmology like dark matter and dark energy, that may be explained by modified gravity theories at
the classical level. Most importantly, we expect that General Relativity or other classical modified
gravity theories should be replaced by a quantum theory of spacetime, geometry and gravity at the
more fundamental level. The arguments for this conclusion are many and, even if not fully conclusive,
make the conclusion rather consensual in the community. So we should consider what happens to time
in quantum gravity. The detailed answer will depend on the specifics of the theory, but such more
fundamental theory of quantum gravity has not been established and there are several candidates,
which are in fact quite different in their basic mathematical structures and principles, although they
also share many ingredients. We have to content ourselves, then, with a less detailed answer based
on general aspects shared by several quantum gravity formalisms or simply part of the definition of
the quantum gravity problem.
3.1 Quantum GR, quantum fields, quantum (relational) time
We would identify as a theory of quantum gravity and quantum spacetime, roughly speaking, any
quantum theory that reduces to (some modified version of) General Relativity in a classical (and
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probably macroscopic) approximation. We should consider also the possibility that the quantum
formalism itself has to be modified to be applied to spacetime, but let’s assume for now that this is not
the case, for simplicity. Then, the simplest possibility, at least conceptually, is that the fundamental
quantum theory is the result of ‘quantizing the classical gravity theory’by one of the many quantization
algorithms we have successfully applied to other field theories (canonical, path integral, etc). Several
approaches to quantum gravity can be understood from this perspective [45, 46, 47].
Then, the ontology of the resulting quantum theory is the same as that of the classical one. The
world remains constituted by continuum fields, among which the gravitational one is the one strictly
associated to geometric spacetime properties. Physical notions of space and time, as in GR, remain
dependant on relational constructions involving several (components of) dynamical fields, except in
very special cases where preferred temporal or spatial directions can be identified. However, the
same relational constructions should be performed at the quantum level, and the same fields become
quantum systems, starting from the gravitational field. This step to the quantum domain brings
radical changes for our notions of space and time.
The quantum nature of the gravitational field implies the quantum nature of spacetime geometry and
the quantum nature of all the other dynamical fields implies the quantum nature of any notion of time
constructed using them as relational clocks (more generally, reference frames). Possessing a quantum
nature means being subject to uncertainty relations, irreducible quantum fluctuations, some form of
contextuality, discreteness of observable values, and, in the case of composite systems, entanglement,
in turn challenging our common sense notions of realism, separability, and locality. When these
properties are attributed to geometric and spatiotemporal quantities, we clearly enter a new and
wild conceptual (and physical) domain. All geometric quantities, like areas of surfaces, distances
and temporal intervals between events, curvature in a region, are then subject to superposition and
quantum fluctuations, they may be forced to have only discrete values, they may be incompatible
with one another (like position and momentum of a quantum particle), and they may be restricted
to a contextual-only specification. The causal structure of spacetime itself (i.e. the list of potential
cause-effect relations) will be similarly subject to quantum fluctuations and superpositions. And the
list of quantum weirdnesses of a quantum spacetime could go on. The relational strategy for the
definition of time will be further affected by the quantum properties of any physical field we choose
as our relational frame, in particular our clock [48, 49, 50], itself subject to quantum fluctuations,
uncertainty relations etc.
So time will be whatever it was in GR, but quantum. But a quantum time is even farther away from
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any standard notion of time on which our common sense, and our classical physics is based, that we
can definitely say we are in a very different world, or better at a very different, more fundamental
level of our understanding of this world. The physical and philosophical literature has barely started
to explore these new conceptual depths, also due to the limitations of our current quantum gravity
formalisms, but it should be clear that we will need a profound reconstruction of the basic pillars
of both our physics and our philosophy to account for these new aspects. With this quantum step,
we must abandon, for example, any value-definiteness of spatiotemporal quantities and possibly any
continuous notion of space and time, if spatiotemporal observables end up having discrete values [51].
The idea of quantum reference frames and indefinite causal structures or temporal order, moreover,
represent new challenges for the foundations of quantum mechanics themselves [49, 50], and together
with the notion of a preferred time direction we are forced to abandon also unitary time evolution
as the key dynamical element of quantum mechanics. To make sense of dynamics in absence of such
unitary evolution is sometimes referred to as ‘the problem of time’in quantum gravity, and it is the
direct quantum counterpart of the diffeomorphism invariance of classical General Relativity (as such,
it affects space in the same manner). As we argued, there is no ‘solution’to this problem, strictly
speaking, as long as the symmetries of the classical theory are preserved [52, 53, 54]. The absence of
a preferred temporal direction is a fact, and the relational strategy is the best way, we maintain, to
extract from the theory a physical, if approximate, notion of time and evolution.
3.2 The timeless emergence of time from a quantum time
The quantum aspects of the story are not minor additions and they fully justify to speak of the
emergence of the general relativistic time from quantum gravity. To start with, they prevent any of
the circumvention strategies of the problems given by the absence of a preferred time direction that are
available in classical GR, e.g. working with special solutions possessing preferred temporal directions
(in the quantum theory there is no state that corresponds to a classical solution of the theory, if not
approximately only). This is the sense in which the ‘problem of time’is worse in quantum GR than
in classical GR, even if its origin is the same, i.e. diffeomorphism invariance.
The set of approximations and mathematical procedures, choices of special states and focus on specific
observables that lead to classical GR from quantum gravity (realized to various degrees of success in
current quantum gravity formalisms, see for example [55, 56, 57] in the loop quantum gravity and
spin foam context) that go under the collective label of ‘classical limit’would also lead to recovering
the temporal observables computed as relations between classical fields, from corresponding quantum
14
observables. There will be novelty enough, since the classical limit brings continuous quantities where,
probably, there were discrete ones, value-definiteness where there were indefinite temporal order and
fluctuating temporal durations, and the classical dynamical aspects of time and its relation to space
where we had the limitations of contextuality and non-commutativity of quantum observables. And
certainly the classical world described in its spatiotemporal aspects by General Relativity is robust
enough, since quantum features of gravity and spacetime are so hard to detect (so much that we
have very little guidance from observations, in our search for the more fundamental quantum gravity
description). In this respect, we can see also the limitation of the global deparametrization strategy
at the quantum level. Deparametrizing the theory at the classical level and then quantizing , e.g.
by reduced phase space quantization [42, 43, 44] in terms of the canonical decomposition defined by
the matter fields introduced as clock and rods, requires neglecting the quantum nature of the clock
field itself, thus of an important aspect of its physical nature, and of the effects that its quantum
properties may have on other fields.. Again, we see that a global notion of time, convenient as it may
be and also in this more physical sense of a relational clock, remains an idealization or something
that can be valid only in some special approximation of the fundamental theory.
This further sense in which time as we know it is emergent, this additional level of emergence is again,
first of all, inter-theoretic and synchronic; it corresponds to a change of theoretical framework and
associated conceptual one, but it is as such not a physical process in itself and by definition not a
temporal one in any case, thus it would not qualify as an instance of diachronic emergence. It is not
an ontological emergence either, since we have assumed that the fundamental entities in quantum
gravity are the same fields that GR deals with, only turned into quantum entities7.
We lack a complete theory of quantum gravity, though, so we do not know the precise details of the
physical circumstances that allow us to pass from the fundamental description of the world, in which
all fields including the gravitational one, and thus spacetime, are quantum entities, to the one of
GR, in which spacetime, geometry and all dynamical fields behave classically. In this situation, it is
hard to characterize clearly how this transition to a classical world comes about. We expect it to be
the result of a physical process, not only a shift in the most appropriate theoretical description. It
7In our analogy with water molecules and liquid water, we remain at the hydrodynamic level with the system of
interest being liquid water and we move to a regime in which the quantum nature of the fluid (not the constituent
molecules, whose existence we simply ignore and never enter the picture) can be neglected altogether. The analogy is
not so compelling in this case, since liquid water is a fluid whose macroscopic quantum properties can basically always
be neglected. A better analogy would be with superlfuid, which manifest macroscopic quantum behaviour and thus a
non-trivial classical limit.
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should take place whenever the relevant length scales, curvature scales and related change value from
trans-Planckian to sub-Planckian ones8. This has happened, for example, in the very early universe,
close to the big bang singularity predicted by the classical theory. In fact, many quantum gravity
theorists and cosmologist would expect just that: a transition from a fully quantum epoch in which
full quantum gravity is the correct description of the world, close to the big bang, to a classical one
governed by General Relativity (better, semiclassical gravity with quantum matter fields living on
classical spacetime), when the universe is larger and it has ‘classicalized’in its spatiotemporal aspects,
due also to the interactions between quantum matter fields and quantum geometry.
This is all good, as far as the general idea of a quantum-to-classical transition being a physical process
is concerned. It becomes problematic if we take seriously also our temporal language and interpret
the transition as something happening in time.
Consider the picture in more detail, as we move backward towards the early universe, starting from
our present classical one. We select a time variable, first of all, to be allowed to speak of early and late
universe and of cosmological evolution. The specific choice is not so relevant, now, but it corresponds
to some physical degrees of freedom (a field, a component of it, or a function of it) being used as a
clock, with all the other physical quantities expressed as a function of its value. This value should be
well-defined, to be used as a good reference. In a quantum world, this means that it corresponds to a
semiclassical observable, whose mean value we use as reference value and whose quantum fluctuations
are negligible compared to it (otherwise we would not be able to ‘follow’the evolution at all9. Then
we follow the evolution of the universe and all that it contains in relation to this clock, toward earlier
epochs. At some point (in clock time) quantum aspects of the world (i.e. of all the physical systems)
start becoming relevant. As we move further toward the big bang, they become even more relevant
and we enter the full quantum gravity domain. The transition is then understood as a physical and
temporal process.
Not so fast, though. For this to be the case, the temporal observable defined by our clock should
remain (approximately) classical, otherwise the very notion of relational time evolution would cease
8Let us stress that this expectation is in line with our effective field theory intuition and based on established general
relativistic and quantum physics, therefore very solid but also subject to change in a more fundamental theory.
9Notice that the possibility that we use instead the eigenvalues of an observable chosen as clock is problematic,
although often studied [58], because in this case we would be considering states in which the conjugate observable to
the clock time is maximally uncertain, and we should expect these large quantum fluctuations to be physically relevant
to, impacting somehow on the evolution of the other physical systems. We would be dealing in fact with a highly
quantum state of the system; it is not the kind of time variables we use in cosmology.
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to be meaningful. Even within a full theory of quantum gravity, there may well be a physical situation
like this, with a specific subsystem, which happens to be the one we have chosen as a clock (maybe
exactly for this reason) remains classical also while all the others start manifesting strong quantum
fluctuations and other quantum properties. But then there is no emergence of classical, relativistic
time from the quantum version of the same we have in the full quantum gravity theory, in such
transition. It does not correspond to the situation we wanted to interpret as a physical process also
with respect to time itself. In a situation in which, on the contrary, as we follow the evolution of the
universe backwards in relational time, our clock itself starts manifesting more and more its quantum
nature, we do indeed face the type of transition from quantum time to classical time (or vice versa, in
this case) that we were considering to speak of emergence of classical time as a dynamical, physical
process, but its own temporal characterization stops exactly where (or when) the transition occurs.
Beyond that, in the full quantum regime in which we only have quantum time (and space, and
geometry, and causality) any standard notion of temporal evolution (including the relational one)
stops being applicable. No diachronic emergence, again. The emergence of time remains timeless.
We are going to encounter again this type of situation (an inter-theoretic emergence that is not
ontological, that could be in correspondence with a physical process, that can be ‘met at the end
point of some temporal evolution’, but that remains timeless) again in the following.
4 What is time in quantum gravity, if this is not quantized
GR
The story of the progressive disappearance of time in a quantum gravity context, when moving toward
the more fundamental level, and of its emergent nature when seen in the opposite direction, takes a
more radical turn in quantum gravity formalisms in which the theory is not the straightforward quan-
tum version of classical General Relativity (or other gravitational theory for the metric field coupled
to matter fields). By definition, these formalisms are defined in terms of a different ontology. The
fundamental entities are not continuum fields (including the metric), be them classical or quantum,
and such continuum fields are themselves collective, emergent entities.
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4.1 A timeless ontological emergence of time
What the new fundamental entities are depends on the specific formalism one considers, and similarly
specific is how different they are from the usual spatiotemporal ontology of fields. The notions of
space and time as encoded in field-based observables in General Relativity are complex notions, we we
have explained, involving topological and metric (extension) features, continuity and directionality,
causal and relational aspects. Therefore, we are in presence of new entities, whenever we do not deal
with continuum fields, and with a more radical absence of the usual notions of space and time, i.e. a
non-spatiotemporal level of understanding the physical world, whenever one or more fo these features
are absent or modified. And the more ingredients of the usual complex notions we drop, the farther
away from space and time we end up being. We stress that this is an independent step away from
spacetime as we know it with respect to the upgrading of the classical constructions to the quantum
level, distinct from the inclusion of the quantum properties of fields into the picture.
Examples of candidate fundamental entities of non-spatiotemporal nature, in the above sense, are
the spin networks and spin foams in canonical Loop Quantum Gravity [59], spin foams models [60]
and group field theories [61], the abstract simplices and associated piecewise-flat geometries in lattice
quantum gravity [62], spin foam models [60], and tensor models and tensorial group field theories
[63, 64, 65], the posets of causal set theory [66]. Also in string theory the same idea of an emergent
spacetime is central, thanks to non-perturbative results like the string dualities [67], even though
there are less clear suggestions for what the fundamental non-spatiotemporal entities could be; in
proposals like the IKKT Matrix Theory [68], for example, they are in fact of a similar combinatorial
and algebraic nature than in the other approaches.
This is a very radical step. The big challenge at the conceptual level, beyond the physical and
mathematical ones, is to gain any sort of intuition of the nature of the new fundamental entities,
since our physical thinking is grounded solidly in space and time. And understanding is more than
just intuition. This change in fundamental ontology requies by definition the development of a
metaphysics in which the usual notions of space and time, thus location and ontological distinction
based on it, spatial contiguity, temporal change and permanence, and so on, do not feature in the very
definition of existence or reality. It is quite a challenge for contemporary and future philosophers,
and an important one.
A second set of ontological worries concerns instead spacetime in this emergence scenario, and it has
to do with how the ontological status of the entities featuring in our physical theories is affected by
established emergence relations. If one adopts a ‘fundamentalist ontology’according to which only
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the entities featuring ‘fundamental’theories are entitles to ontological status, while those appearing
in emergent or effective descriptions do not, the logical conclusion is that space and time cannot be
real entities. This metaphysical position is questionable in itself, even before considering quantum
gravity. Think of the paradigmatic example of emergence given by molecules and fluids, where this
position would imply that fluids, actually, do not exist in a proper sense. It is clear, however, that a
new level of philosophical difficulties arise when it is space and time that are deprived of their status
as elements of reality. The way out is some form of ‘multi-level ontology’in which both fundamental
and emergent entities are understood as real. How articulate in detail and in a solid manner this
form of ontology, however, is itself an interesting and non-trivial challenge.
4.2 The timeless emergence of time via a continuum approximation
Let’s move back to the physical aspects of spacetime emergence in this scenario. Starting from the
new candidates for fundamental quantum entities of the world proposed by one or the other of the
current quantum gravity formalisms, the emergence of spacetime corresponds then, first of all, to the
emergence of fields, including the metric, and (a modified version of) General Relativity from their
collective quantum dynamics. Once this step is taken, the usual (relational) spacetime constructions
and notions of relativistic physics can be used, and, further down the line, the common sense notions
of space and time can be obtained in correspondence with special cases or further approximations.
This step is what goes under the generic label of ‘continuum approximation’in quantum gravity
approaches, since in most cases the new non-spatiotemporal entities are discrete in nature, in one
form or another. To understand how to perform this step is (one of) the main outstanding issue
in all quantum gravity approaches. To do so, these approaches have to adapt to a background
independent context, first, and then apply the same methods routinely used in quantum many-body
theory to extract macroscopic and collective physics from the fundamental quantum dynamics, e.g.
coarse graining techniques and renormalization group. This is if fact a very active research area in
fundamental quantum gravity approaches [69, 70, 71, 72, 73].
The result would be to pass from the ‘atomic’description of quantum gravity to the quantum gravity
counterpart of an ‘hydrodynamic’approximation in terms of continuum quantities, within which one
could then extract a classical General Relativistic dynamics for spacetime and geometry. In some
approaches to quantum gravity, like tensorial group field theory, this hydrodynamic analogy is in
fact quite literally realized, in order to extract some effective gravitational (cosmological) physics
[4, 74, 75]. The extraction of gravitational dynamics and its approximate rewriting in terms of
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temporal evolution would then be performed at the effective, hydrodynamic level, adopting once
more the relational strategy in terms of the emergent fields (for an example of this procedure, in the
same quantum gravity formalism, see [76, 77]).
If the starting point is quantum and the result is classical, a ‘classical approximation’should be
involved as well, together with the continuum approximation. However, we stress that this is a distinct
step, conceptually, physically and mathematically. Depending on the details of the quantum gravity
formalism and of different physical situations, it may take place in conjunction with the continuum
approximation, having them somehow intertwined. However, being distinct, they may take place
independently. In this case, one should further notice that the order in which they are taken is not
irrelevant. Experience with quantum many-body systems teaches us that the quantum properties
of the fundamental constituents may be crucial for capturing the correct macroscopic properties of
the collective system formed by them. In the analogy with atoms or molecules and fluids, we have
quantum atoms whose fundamental description is expressed by a many-body quantum Schroedinger
equation or a corresponding quantum field theory, and whose collective physics can be described by
the hydrodynamics of a continuum fluid, capturing all the relevant observables and dynamics at a
macroscopic scale in which the individual dynamics of the atoms is not of interest and the atoms
themselves are not relevant anymore as physical entities.
But we know very well that there are fluids and superfluids, differing at macroscopic level in a
physically (and technological) very relevant manner, and that specific features of the latter are directly
due to the quantum properties of the fundamental atoms, e.g. their bosonic statistics. In order to
correctly capture these properties one cannot take first a classical approximation of the quantum
theory of atoms (after which they would be described, say, as classical particles) and then look
for a continuum, hydrodynamic approximation. That is, for many systems it works fine, but for
many others it fails to be physically correct, failing to account for macroscopic quantum effects like
superfluidity, superconductivity, quantum phases of matter, etc.
Notice that we are not referring only to the quantum properties of the atomic constituents being
visible if one looks carefully enough beyond the continuum, hydrodynamic approximation, or at
small enough distance scales or at high enough energy, This is not under question. It is a logical
necessity that one can go beyond the continuum description and be able to distinguish physical effects
due to the underlying atomic structure. Otherwise the atomic description would not qualify as useful
as a physical theory. In the quantum gravity case, there is no question that fundamental quantum
gravity models should predict modifications of classical GR at high energies or small distances or due
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to the quantum nature of fields. The same is true also for quantum gravity formalisms that are the
straightforward quantization of the classical theory.
In a context in which spacetime is emergent in this more radical sense, an entirely different type of
quantum gravity effects is at least conceivable. Some of them have to do with the very existence
of different fundamental entities, and maybe with their discrete nature, but not directly with their
quantum properties. Others will be the result of their quantum properties. In both cases, their
collective effects can well be macroscopic, i.e. visible at low energy and large distance scales, since
they are not captured by the effective field theory intuition based on given spacetime structures. An
examples of physical phenomena that have been discussed in this spirit, in a quantum gravity context,
is dark energy [78]. What is the case for spacetime and gravity? Are some of their features directly
due to the quantum properties of the fundamental, non-spatiotemporal quantum gravity constituents?
Is our universe akin to a quantum fluid? We do not know yet. We are trying to find out.
4.3 What kind of emergence is this?
In terms of classifications, this more radical type of emergence of spacetime in quantum gravity
theories is certainly associated to ontological emergence, as we have stressed. And it is, necessarily
so in our ‘naturalistic framework’an inter-theoretic emergence too. The step from the description
of the world in terms quantum gravity atoms to the one in terms of continuum fields may be also
made necessary in correspondence with physical situations, e.g. with cosmological phenomena close
to the big bang being the natural candidates. It may well be the case that at the high densities
found close to the big bang, at the very origin of our universe, the ‘hydrodynamic’description of
the universe corresponding to General Relativity breaks down not (only) because quantum effects
manifesting the quantum nature of fields become important, but because the very description in
terms of continuum fields, thus continuum space and time, break down. This breakdown could then
be understood in terms of the properties and dynamics of the quantum gravity atoms themselves,
providing then an explanation and a quantitative account for it. The new atomic description offered
by a more fundamental theory of quantum gravity would be shown to be necessary. So the emergence
of spacetime from non-spatiotemporal atoms, thus also in this more radical sense, would be as physical
as as it can get.
But would it be also an example of ‘diachronic’emergence? would it be a ‘temporal’process itself?
It would be hard to respond in the affirmative, in general. Consider again the analogy with atoms
and fluids. There are many physical situations in which the atomic structure of fluids is immediately
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relevant for understanding their properties, and in which, correspondingly, we have to switch from
the hydrodynamic description to the quantum atomic one. The example of superfluidity is again a
good one. But we would not say that something has happened to the atoms that has ‘produced’the
fluid as a result, when we look at a Bose condensate manifesting its superfluidity properties more
and more (or less and less) in changing physical conditions. We remain in the context of an inter-
theoretic relation, with a solid physical motivation and impact. There may be cases in which a
‘temporal’characterization is instead quite appropriate. In the same example of fluids, consider the
case in which the fluid becomes less and less dense as a result of its own dynamics. Then (quantum)
statistical fluctuations due to its atomic structure could become, in relative terms, more and more
relevant and thus force us to switch to the atomic description of the system. One could then say that
the emergence of the fluid from atoms, and vice versa, is associated to a dynamical process as well.
Bringing this intuition to the case of time in quantum gravity, however, we face exactly the same
type of conceptual and technical difficulties we encountered when discussing emergence of (classical)
time in quantum General Relativity from the disappearance of quantum effects from the dynamics
of fields. We can hypothetically follow the evolution of the universe toward the would-be Big Bang,
only to find out that, sufficiently close to it, the whole continuum description of the universe in terms
of spatiotemporal fields needs to be replaced by one in terms of non-spatiotemporal quantum gravity
atoms, but there is no way we can speak of temporal evolution, once we (have been forced to) adopt
such description.
The only alternative possibility to this conclusion is if some (relational) notion of time is somehow
preserved from dissolution into the atomic description, so that it can still be used to describe the
dynamics of the ‘atoms of space’themselves. For example, this would happen in a formulation of
the fundamental theory in which a deparametrized dynamics with respect to some internal clock
variable can be adopted before quantization. with the consequence that the corresponding relational
time is treated as an external parameter and can be used to label the evolution of all the other non-
spatiotemporal entities. This procedure is used in some formulations of tensorial group field theory,
and in its cosmological applications [79, 80, 81], for example.
However, as it is the case in classical GR, the resulting theory can only be, in general, a special sector
of the full theory, whose predictions are at best only approximately valid and only in special circum-
stances. Specifically, they will only be valid provided one can neglect the quantum and dynamical
nature of the degrees of freedom chosen as relational clock. In a more general situation, though, we
cannot expect this to be valid. The temporal description of the process leading to the disappearance
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of time, that is, ceases to be valid exactly when such disappearance takes place, by definition. There
is no diachronic emergence across the two descriptions. There can be, at best, a diachronic (i.e. in
terms of temporal change) approach toward the disappearance of time, and a diachronic account from
the emergence of time onward. This is where the analogy with ordinary atoms and fluids, that live
in spacetime, fails and we are left in search of new intuitions10.
5 Things get worse, for time: quantum gravity phase tran-
sitions and geometrogenesis
The story of the emergence of time (and space) is even more complex than this. The same is true, in
fact, also in the more familiar case of atoms and fluids.
5.1 Inequivalent continuum phases and phase transitions
The point is that the continuum limit, encoding the collective behaviour of atoms and, more gen-
erally, quantum many-body systems is not unique: starting from the same microscopic quantum
constituents, their collective dynamics may lead to very different macroscopic phases, that is very
10An important remark should be added. In the context of a quantum gravity formalism that is based on new types
of fundamental degrees of freedom, different from continuum fields, one has always the option to take a perspective
in which these new structures are purely mathematical artefacts or useful technical tools to arrive at a true physical
definition fo the theory that is in fact based on the usual continuum fields. Indeed, several practitioners view in this
way some some of the quantum gravity formalisms we have mentioned. In this case, most of the technical challenges
in recovering such continuum description and a viable gravitational description would remain exactly the same (they
are ‘interpretation-independent’). What changes is of course that one would not have to worry about conceptual or
physical issues related to the nature of the new fundamental entities (since they would not be ‘real’) nor about the
nature of a new emergence process, since we would be in the same situation as in the previous section. The other
difference is that one now has to impose on the theory the requirement that no sign of the structures used as technical
tools to recover continuum physics should survive the reconstruction procedure.They should entirely disappear from
the final result in the computation of any physical quantity. This becomes a key constraint in the definition of the
‘continuum limit’. If one adopts the opposite viewpoint and regards the new structures as somehow physical or ‘real’,
then the conceptual issues cannot be avoided. Moreover, some signature of their existence should in fact survive the
continuum limit, otherwise it would be entirely vacuous to consider them real. For the same reason, the choice between
these two perspectives is not arbitrary but, as always in physical theories, will have to be decided by observations.
Only if such observables consequences of the existence of the new fundamental entities can be theoretically derived,
first, and then experimentally confirmed, then the ‘realist’perspective will find a strong support.
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different macroscopic physical systems11. The same water molecules that give us liquid water in a
certain range of temperature and pressure, as their macroscopic counterpart, can also give us vapour
when temperatures are higher, and solid ice when they are lower. And thinking again at superflu-
ids, the same Helium-4 atoms that constitute them at very low temperatures will instead produce
standard fluids at higher temperatures and gaseous systems at even higher ones.
The appearance of different macroscopic phases in the continuum limit of quantum many-body sys-
tems is the rule, and a constant source of marvel and challenges, concerned with the investigation of
the rich set of new features that is shown in the different phases and of the conditions for the phase
transitions leading from one to the other.
What should we expect in quantum gravity, when studying in detail the collective behaviour and
continuum limit of the candidate ‘atoms of space’suggested by any given quantum gravity formalism?
Just the same non-uniqueness of the result of the limit, the same richness of emergent macroscopic
physics, the same variety of possible macroscopic phases. Examples of different continuum phases
and analyses of the related phase transitions can be found in much of the recent quantum gravity
literature, e.g. [82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88].
If any of the proposed quantum gravity formalisms has a chance of being a viable description of
the physical world, and of providing a satisfactory explanation for the emergence of spacetime and
gravitational physics from a more fundamental non-spatiotemporal reality, then at least one of the
continuum phases it produces should be properly spatiotemporal and geometric. That is, it should
allow to reconstruct an effective (and approximate only) gravitational dynamics based on fields,
spacetime and geometry and described by (some possibly modified form of) General Relativity. In
other words, in at least one such phase one should find herself in the situation described in the previous
section and, from there, move to the notions of space and time encoded in usual relativistic physics.
This may or may not involve, as an intermediate step, a further approximate regime governed by
some form of ‘quantum GR’, depending on what is the exact relation between continuum and classical
approximations in the quantum gravity formalism being considered.
11To tell the whole story, the converse is also true. There are usually different microscopic systems that can give
rise to the same macroscopic behaviour, thus the same macroscopic physical system, with their microscopic differences
becoming irrelevant in the limit. This is the phenomenon of universality in statistical and quantum many-body physics.
In other words, just like emergence is not a unique relation, reduction is not unique either, in general.
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5.2 The fundamental ontology is even more timeless
If one such phase is a physical necessity for the viability fo the theory, and the existence of several geo-
metric phases (e.g. describing spatiotemporal and gravitational physics around different backgrounds,
or governed by different gravitational theories) is also a possibility, the possibility of non-geometric,
non-spatiotemporal phases raises many new issues, both physical and philosophical.
The first implication is that the non-spatiotemporal nature of the fundamental entities is more pro-
foundly so that it could have been suggested if there were only geometric phases in the continuum
limit of the theory. Indeed, if the continuum limit were to always produce spacetime and gravitational
physics, one could argue that the fundamental entities, albeit not spatio-temporal or geometric in the
usual sense, possessed features that would necessarily lead to the emergence of spacetime under collec-
tive quantum evolution; they could be seen as possessing some sort of ‘proto-spatiotemporal’ features,
some more primitive form of spacetime characterization, whose relation to spacetime itself was strong
enough to to ensure the appearance of the latter after some approximation. One could even argue
that, in this case, the usual notions of space and time would need to be adapted in the more fundamen-
tal theory, but do not cease to be meaningful, and question the very notion of spacetime emergence
or its relevance. Not so if non-geometric phases can be produced by the same fundamental quantum
gravity entities. This very possibility eliminates any necessary link between their features (quantum
observables) and spacetime: the same quantities that, under some specific conditions, can be used to
define and reconstruct time in one continuum phase of the theory, can produce non-spatiotemporal
continuum physics under different circumstances (e.g. different values of the parameters entering
the definition of the fundamental quantum dynamics). The issue is physical, of course, because it
means that the step from quantum gravity to emergent spacetime physics is more subtle and more
technically challenging than if it was otherwise, and that the emergent continuum physics is richer. It
also implies that the philosophical challenges to be faced when establishing the new ‘quantum gravity
ontology’of the new non-spatiotemporal entities have to be solved without even the indirect support
of spatiotemporal intuitions that a necessary link between them and spacetime would have allowed.
In other words, the existence of different continuum phases including non-spatiotemporal ones makes
the ontological emergence of spacetime even more radical, emphasizing the novelty of space and time
from the point of view of the fundamental quantum gravity constituents of the universe.
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5.3 Geometrogenesis
Beyond the ontology of the fundamental entities and the added complexity of the continuum limit
that should lead to spacetime emergence, the existence of different phases of the quantum gravity
dynamics raises interesting new issues at the continuum level, related to the physics and philosophy
of the phase transitions leading from non-geometric to spatiotemporal phases. Such phase transitions
have been dubbed geometrogenesis in the quantum gravity literature [89, 90, 91, 92], and (whether
interpreted ‘realistically’ or not) are actively investigated in several quantum gravity approaches
[82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88].
A first question is how to characterize the existence of the transition. What are the quantum gravity
observables that show the relevant discontinuities12 at the transition point? and what are the relevant
quantities that can play the role of order parameters, identifying the different phases with their
different values? The answers can only be specific to different quantum gravity formalisms, but
since it is spacetime and geometry that emerge at the phase transition, it must be geometric and
spatiotemporal quantities that characterize it, by acquiring physically meaningful values only in
the geometric phase. Various examples have been suggested in the quantum gravity literature, for
example the metric field components themselves [93] or the universe volume, that would be identically
vanishing (in expectation value) in the non-geometric phase and non-vanishing and with a non-trivial
dynamics in the geometric one13.
A second question is of course what are the observable features of such phase transitions. What is the
physics of geometrogenesis? To answer this, quantum gravity models should identify geometrogenesis
with some precise physical circumstances, and again the most natural suggestion is the physical regime
associated, in the classical theory, to spacetime singularities, like the interior of black holes and the
cosmological beginning, the Big Bang. The possible answers to this question are also context-specific,
with different quantum gravity formalisms offering different proposals. In general, the approach to
phase transitions is characterized in terms of strong fluctuations of some key physical quantity (e.g.
of the order parameters themselves), thus this second question can only be tackled together with
the first one. But the physics of phase transitions in quantum many-body systems is very rich, so
the range of possibilities is large and should make us optimistic about the potential testability of a
geometrogenesis scenario in quantum gravity.
12A phase transition is defined by non-analytic behaviour of some observable
13This would be in analogy with the Higgs mechanism of spontaneous symmetry breaking, in which the Higgs field
acquires a non-vanishing expectation value, giving mass to all other fields, in the broken phase.
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It should be clear that the main objective of any phenomenological analysis of the physics of quan-
tum gravity phase transitions should focus on the testable phenomena on the spatiotemporal side of
geometrogenesis, i.e. the geometric phase we live in. This is simply because it is hard to imagine
how we could access directly the hypothetical non-geometric phase, of whose existence we should
then identify instead some interesting indirect testable consequence. For example, in the scenario in
which the geometrogenesis phase transition is how quantum gravity replaces the big bang singularity
in the very early universe, one should look for its possible imprints in the consequent modification
of the universe dynamics and in the physics of cosmological perturbations in the very first instants
of the history fo the universe, in particular in the CMB spectrum. Indeed, some quantum gravity
formalisms are investigating this kind of cosmological scenarios, two examples being group field the-
ory condensate cosmology [4, 74, 75] and string gas cosmology [94] (which is14 strictly speaking an
example of the emergence of space only, not time), and some more phenomenological proposals for
possible signatures of such phase transition have been put forward [95, 96].
5.4 Geometrogenesis as a physical process: a temporal characterization?
In the above discussion we have assumed the perspective in which the geometrogenesis phase transition
is a physical phenomenon (not just a mathematical artefact), and made some educated guesses about
which physical regimes could be associated with it. But is it a temporal process in any sense? Can
we say, for example, that the universe underwent a transition to a geometric phase at some point in
our past from an earlier non-geometric one? The issue if of course with respect to which temporal
direction and variable we would make such statement. The question is very natural, since phase
transitions provide prototypical examples of diachronic emergence, of novel behaviour appearing as
a result of the actual temporal evolution of a system. Think for example of ice melting as we raise
its temperature, by pumping heat into the system.
Still, it should also be recalled that the typical way in which the phase structure of a physical system
and its phase transitions are studied is in the context of equilibrium statistical mechanics and the
renormalization group, and temporal evolution does not really play any role in them (by definition,
there is no temporal evolution at equilibrium). The treatment of the same system out of equilibrium,
within a formalism that allows to talk properly of evolution across the phase transition, is possible but
more involved. To prove, using a realistic out-of-equilibrium description, that the phase transitions
we normally describe with equilibrium statistical mechanics (thus as associated to different values of
14If the pre-transition phase is associated with vanishing, rather than just constant, scale factor.
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(coupling) constants), are in fact processes produced by the (quantum) dynamics of the system, is
possible in many cases but in remains an open issue in general. As a result, one normally appeals to
the fact that equilibrium statistical mechanics is a very good approximation to the actual physical
behaviour of dynamical systems whenever their evolution is not too fast, and relies on the possibility
of external observers in the lab to adjust the conditions of the physical system and (slowly) tune
the values of the parameters/couplings that characterize its description within equilibrium statistical
mechanics.
Three points need to be noted now, to properly appreciate the corresponding situation in quantum
gravity. First, although the physics of phase transitions requires the microscopic theory to be prop-
erly understood, we are discussing an issue that could in principle we investigated at the continuum
level, since we are dealing with the interpretation of continuum phases and their associated transi-
tions. Second, a formal description of the phase diagram of quantum gravity models in a context
akin to ‘equilibrium (quantum) statistical mechanics’as opposed to an ‘out-of-equilibrium’description
is inevitable at the fundamental level, simply because at the fundamental level we do not have a
preferred temporal direction that can be used to define temporal evolution15. Third, in general we
cannot assume any hidden observer, external to the system (i.e. to the spacetime (region) under
consideration), that could tune the parameters entering such formulation, thus ‘driving’the system to
toward a phase transition; this is even more evident if we think of a geometrogenesis phase transition
to be associated to the very early universe. On this basis, we need to conclude that geometrogenesis
cannot be seen as an example of diachronic emergence but as another kind of synchronic one. Better
still, since time simply disappears from the fundamental quantum gravity description of the world,
geometrogenesis is another kind of a-chronic emergence as all the other kinds of emergence of time
in quantum gravity that we have discussed above.
This is the conclusion that seems to be forced upon us at the fundamental level. But can geometroge-
nesis be given a temporal interpretation at least in an approximate, partial sense? We have discussed
how this possibility can be realized in classical General Relativity and then in a quantum version of
General Relativity. We have also seen how the same could be possible even if quantum gravity is
based on more radically non-spatiotemporal entities, and gravitational physics in terms of continuum
fields and spacetime is akin to its hydrodynamic description.
Indeed, a viable strategy to give an approximate temporal description of geometrogenesis could be to
15This absence makes of course challenging also to define the notion of ‘equilibrium’states in quantum gravity, lacking
the usual definition and construction. However, this challenge can be met.
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extend to this context the same relational strategy for the definition of time that we have seen at play
in the other contexts. First, we can certainly try to reformulate the effective continuum dynamics that
is emergent from quantum gravity in a relational language, in terms of some internal ‘clock’variable
(itself only an emergent quantity from some underlying subset of degrees of freedom of the theory).
Using this, we can follow the evolution of the system toward the early universe. If at some point in
this ‘backward evolution’we encounter either the phenomenological effects or the structural features
that we can associated to a geometrogenesis phase transition, then we would be allowed to state that
such phase transition has indeed taken place in the early universe, at the beginning of our cosmic
history. This cosmological scenario is being investigated in detail, for example, in the context of
group field theory condensate cosmology [76, 77, 97].
But can we then follow the same evolution across the transition? The answer depends on whether
the relational reformulation of the quantum gravity dynamics remains valid across the transition.
This consideration, and the following, applies also if the relational strategy is applied in the very initial
formulation of the theory, recasting it in a ‘deparametrized’form before quantization. Such strategy,
analogous to the one applied extensively in quantum General Relativity, has been investigated also
in the (tensorial) group field theory approach. For example, one could think of relying on this
deparametrized form for setting up a non-equilibrium description of the system, in terms of which
tackling the issue of quantum gravity phase transitions as dynamical processes.
If the relational reformulation does remain valid across the transition, we have a geometrogenesis
phase transition that, in a precise sense, can be given a temporal characterization, since it somehow
spares time itself from disappearance16. In general, we should not expect this to be the case, though.
We should rather expect that the very conditions that allow for a relational rewriting of the dynamics
of the theory fail to be valid in such extreme conditions. The universe in its spatiotemporal description
and time itself would dissolve at geometrogenesis17. We would be left with the fundamental description
16The situation would then be very close to the emergent universe scenario in string gas cosmology.
17Also in the context of this discussion of quantum gravity phase transitions and geometrogenesis, we should recall
and stress the remark we have made about the two possible perspectives on the new non-spatiotemporal entities of
quantum gravity. If one deems them as mathematical tools only and maintains instead an ontology of continuum fields,
the non-geometric and non-spatiotemporal phases would have no reason to be considered physical or philosophically
interesting. The technical challenges for the quantum gravity approach (e.g. the need to study the continuum phase
diagram of the theory, to identify the geometric phases, understand their physics and to characterize when one has a
phase transition) would remain the same. But the conceptual ones would not. And the questions about whether the
geometrogenesis is a physical, if not temporal, process would be meaningless, since the non-geometric phase would not
be physical or ‘real’in any way.
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of the same universe provided by the underlying non-spatiotemporal quantum gravity theory.
As we wrote above for the hydrodynamic-like transition in quantum gravity, also in this case the
temporal description of the process leading to the disappearance of time, that is, ceases to be valid
exactly when such disappearance takes place. There is no diachronic emergence across the two
descriptions. There can be, at best, a diachronic (i.e. in terms of temporal change) approach toward
the disappearance of time, and a diachronic account from the emergence of time onward. Once more,
this is where the analogy with ordinary atoms and fluids, that live in spacetime, fails and we are left
in search of new intuitions.
6 Concluding remarks
The search for new intuitions about a timeless universe, one in which time is an emergent notion
and its emergence has the complex, multifaceted nature that we have discussed, is an important
part of the search for a new understanding of time in contemporary physics. It should be clear
from our discussion that this search can only be successful if it is a joint effort of mathematicians,
theoretical and experimental physicists, and philosophers, because the issues to be solved to achieve
such understanding are conceptual as much as they are physical and mathematical. Any more solid
grasp on the hidden richness of time, that we could only glimpse at this stage, will be an exciting
reward for this collective effort.
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